RECENT CASES
sent or joinder are hardly justifiable and cannot be made when receiverships or foreclosures are involuntary. Numerous decisions have justified judicial sales free of the
statutory redemption on the theory that the sales were part of dissolution proceedings.
See Blair v. Illinois Steel Co., 159 Ill. 350, 42 N.E. 895 (1896); Watkins v. Minnesota
Thresher Mfg. Co., 41 Minn. 150, 42 N.W. 862 (1889); Home Mtg. Co. v. Sitka Spruce
P. & P. Co., 148 Ore. 502, 36 P. (2d) 1o38 (1934). In fact the dissolution tag has been
stretched to cover a foreclosure under a trust deed joined with a proceeding under a
creditor's bill. American Mine Equipment Co. v. Ill. Coal Corp., 31 F.(2d) 507 (C.C.A.
7th 1929); cf. Duparquet Huot, Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 220-22 (1936).
None of these decisions satisfactorily defines dissolution proceedings, or distinguishes
them from those proceedings which come within the language of the redemption statutes. It would not be a long step from precedents in these three situations to deny rights
of redemption whenever a judicial sale is incident to corporate reorganization. But
cf. Locey Coal Mines v. Chicago, Will. & Ver. Coal Co., 13I3IIl. 9, 22 N.E. 503 (1889).
Since it is not certain that courts will take this further step, a statutory solution is
desirable. The present Illinois statute allowing a corporate mortgagor to include a
waiver of its redemption right in the mortgage or trust deed (Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev.
Stats. 1935, c. 77, § 18a) is unsatisfactory because (i) it affects only those mortgages
executed after 1933; and (2) it expressly saves the redemption rights given creditors
under the old redemption statute; thus to remove this redemption cloud, the purchaser
at the sale must settle with all creditors having the right to redeem rather than, as
before, settling with the mortgagor alone and effecting a "quick redemption." A
statute, to be adequate should provide that the purchaser of the property of an insolvent corporate debtor takes free from all rights of redemption. For a discussion of the
problems generally involved in redemption, see Durfee and Doddridge, Redemption
from Foreclosure Sale-the Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 825 (1925).
Income Tax-Nature of Income-Bid of Mortgagee at Foreclosures as Evidence
of Value of Land--[United States].-The petitioning life insurance company foreclosed
several mortgages on real estate given to secure loans which were in default. At the
foreclosure sales the company was the only bidder, its bid at each sale being the full
amount of the debt plus the accrued interest, irrespective of the value of the land. The
Board of Tax Appeals sustained an income tax assessment as to the interest, refusing
to consider the company's evidence that the land was not worth the amount due as
principal. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 83 F. (2d) 629 (C.C.A. 6th 1936).
On certiorarito the Supreme Court, held, McReynolds, J., dissenting, reversed. For
purposes of income tax, the bid is conclusive evidence that the principal and interest
were paid. Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 423 (i937).
The decision in the instant case is a product of the arbitrariness of the American
concept of income and of the peculiarity of the American foreclosure sale. In continuing to develop its notion of income, the Court once more adhered strictly to formnot as it did in the cases stemming from Eisner v. Macomber to find realization, but
rather to find gain. The result is in accord with the practice of the Board of Appeals
and with the litigation in the lower federal courts. Helvering v. MissouriState Life Ins.
Co., 78 F. (2d) 778 C.C.A. 8th (i934); National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 4 F.
Supp. iooo (r933).
In finding an interest payment to the taxpayer in the instant case, Mr. Justice

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Brandeis, artfully ignoring patent facts, chose to regard the transaction as a real sale.
The mortgagee qua purchaser buys the land by bidding the debt and.pays himself qua
creditor. In these terms the fact that the debt is discharged by means of a credit from
the mortgagee rather than by the cash of an outsider was deemed to be immaterial by
the court. But it does not necessarily follow that because the debt is discharged, the
creditor has been fully paid. And for purposes of taxing the creditor, the emphasis
should be on what he receives rather than on the manner of discharge.
If the double personality of the mortgagee as creditor-purchaser is disregarded, the
transaction becomes merely the payment of a creditor in specie rather than money,
and the bid becomes a mere device through which the mortgagee arbitrarily determines
what amount to credit on the debt. Tefft, The Myth of Strict Foreclosure, 4 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 575 (1937). Viewing the transaction in this light, the ordinary rules for
taxing payment in specie should apply and the tax-payer would not realize any interest
unless the fair market value of the property received exceeded the principal. Appeal of Sunflower Packing Corp. 2 B.T.A. 3o104 (1925); Scott v. Commissioner,
6 B.T.A. 761 (1927); CaliforniaDelta Farinsv. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1301 (1927);
Cooper-Brannan Naval Stores Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1o5 (1927); 48 Stat.
703 (1934); 26 U.S.C.A. §111 (1935). Further, the case would seem indistinguishable for taxing purposes from the cases in which the mortgagee in lieu of foreclosure
releases the debt in exchange for the land. In fact the release case is stronger for
tax purposes than the foreclosure since as a result of the release, the mortgagee receives a greater benefit in that he takes the land free of the possibility of redemption.
See MidlandLife Ins. Co. v. Helvering, 83 F. (2d) 629 (C.C.A. 6th 1936). In these cases
the tax-payer has not been taxed unless the value of the land exceeded the principal.
Helvering v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 778 (C.C.A. 8th 1934); Hddt v.
Commissioner 16 B.T.A. 1035 (1929).
Since in the release case the mortgagee must bargain with the mortgagor while here
he is, as a practical matter, completely free to set the price at which he will take the
land, there is more basis for taking him at his word as to the value of the land. This
would be in effect income by estoppel. But see Helveringv. Walbridge, 70 F. (2d) 683
(C.C.A. 2d x934). This argument has been supplemented by the consideration that
the mortgagee's high bid when he is free to bid less represents not a gratuity to the
mortgagor but rather his desire for greater protection against redemption. But, while
it is true that the mortgagee receives the benefit of additional protection, it does not
follow that he values this protection at the cash value of his bid; rather he is weighing
the protection against a deficiency judgment of dubious value. Here, then, the mistake is to fall back into the sale idiom and treat the mortgagee as bidding cash rather
than a depreciated chose-in-action.
Apart from mortgage theory, the court found some justification for its decision in
the stern practicalities of an efficient tax administration. It is true that it is easier to
take the bid as conclusive of value than to require an appraisal for tax purposes. However the difficulties of valuation are lessened by the fact that foreclosure proceedings
are a sign that the land is worth less than the debt and that the question is reduced from
how much the land is worth to the simpler inquiry of whether it is worth the principal.
A rebuttable presumption that the bid equalled the value might also be employed to
facilitate administration. Further, the court has on occasion rejected the bid as conclusive of value. Perlman, Mortgage Deficiency Judgments During an Economic
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Depression, 20 Va. L. Rev. 771 (1934); Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246
N.W. 556 (1933).
The practical implications of this decision should be noted. In the case of the
ordinary tax-payer, the hardship of present payment of the tax may be mitigated by
the possibility of introducing the bid in the year when he finally sells the property as a
high cost figure either to establish a loss or to minimize his gain. But see Suncrest
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 375 (1932). But this possibility is not available to the tax-payer in the instant case since life insurance companies are not permitted to include capital gains and losses in their returns. 49 Stat. 1710 (1936); 26
U.S.C.A. § § 202, 203 (1935). Further, insofar as the decision tends to encourage
low bids, it tends to defeat the policy of redemption statutes. Durfee and Doddridge,
Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 Mich. L. Rev.
825 (1925). However, this danger is not too imminent since in most cases the mortgagee may still bid the value of the land and in the case of an insurance company may
bid the full amount of the debt. This decision will very probably not change the practice of bidding less than the value of the land in cases of foreclosure of a bond issue
pursuant to a bondholder's reorganization. Katz, The Protection of Minority Bondholders in Foreclosures and Receiverships, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 517 (1936). However
to take the bid as conclusive of value will avail to the individual bondholders an unreal
present loss with the possibility of an unreal future gain.
Practice-Federal Jurisdiction-Action for Patent Infringement and Unfair Competition-[Federal].-The plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from infringement of his earmuff patent, and from unfair competition consisting in the advertisement and sale by
the defendants of infringing articles. One of the defendants had been a partner of the
plaintiff in the sale of the patented ear-muffs, and on dissolution of the partnership had
agreed not to engage in the business of merchandising such articles in violation of the
plaintiff's patent right. Held, the plaintiff's patent was not valid and consequently no
infringement had occurred. It thus becomes unnecessary to decide the unfair competition charges, for in the absence of diversity of citizenship of the parties, federal jurisdiction is dependent upon the plaintiff's sustaining the patent infringement charges.
Atkins v. Gordon, 86 F. (2d) 595 (C.C.A. 7th 1936).
Sending a plaintiff to a local court when the facts upon which his local claim is based
are already before a federal court supporting his federal claim involves an unnecessary
duplication of effort. It is widely asserted that once a federal court has obtained jurisdiction to decide a federal question, it may adjudicate all closely related questions involved in the case, even though not themselves federal questions. Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 737, 821 (1824); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville .R.
Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191, 192 (19o9); i Foster, Federal Practice 77 (5th ed. 1913). Application of this principle has led to much confusion, particularly where the same facts
give rise to both a federal claim of patent, trade-mark, or copyright infringement and
a local claim of unfair competition. See 40 Harv. L. Rev. 298 (1926). Some courts have
summarily refused to decide the unfair competition claim in the absence of diversity of
citizenship. Schiebel v. Clark, 217 Fed. 76o (C.C.A. 6th 1914) (patent invalid); Planten
v. Gedney, 224 Fed. 382 (C.C.A. 2d 1915) (trade-mark valid and infringed) ;-Faehndrich v. Riddle Cheese Co., 34 F. (2d) 43 (D.C. N.Y. 1929) (trade-mark valid, not infringed). In other cases courts have decided the unfair competition claim on the merits

